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Abstract: 
The central bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP) has encouraged the country’s rural 
banks to merger/consolidate for strengthening their financial soundness and competiveness, and extending 
branch networks with providing some incentive measures mainly financial supports. Overviewing the cases 
realized from January 2000 to December 2016, we found (1) the rural banks which are considered to have 
expansive business strategies spend about a decade to repeat bilateral mergers, unlike BSP’s intention to 
realize “at least five rural banks” in one merger case, (2) most of the mergers are bilateral and one-off cases, 
where surviving banks seem to increase some assets and branch(es). In order to further promote 
mergers/consolidations in the sector, BSP may need to consider modifying the incentive measures to answer 
actual cases, and/or allying them more closely to the on-going capital increase requirements. 
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“Among others, rural banks face increasingly stiffer competition 
from both smaller and bigger players. More cooperative and 
non-government organizations (NGOs) now operate in the 
countryside with relatively lower costs than most rural banks. As 
such, these entities may acquire portions of your market – not only 
from frontier areas but possibly even those you have nurtured 
through time.” (Tetangco, Jr. (2014)) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Under the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022, the objective of the current Duterte 
Administration is to reduce overall poverty rate to 14 percent and poverty incidence in the rural 
areas to 20 percent by year 2022 by promoting inclusive growth. Along with the PDP 
2017-2022, the Government’s 10-point socio-economic agenda includes promoting countryside 
development by catering to the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), which are 
deemed to be able to liberate people from poverty by creating jobs and serving as catalysts for 
growth in their communities. 
For the part of Philippine central bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP) as the 
supervising authority of the country’s banking sector, improving financial access in terms of 
saving and borrowing money nationwide and rationalizing the segmented sector – especially the 
rural bank (RB) sector – has been one of BSP’s strong intentions in the area of developmental 
issues regarding the banking sector. Accordingly, the BSP has provided the RBs of several 
incentive measures to encourage them to merge or consolidate in order to improve/strengthen 
their financial basis and competitiveness, and to expand their physical network. The objectives 
of this preliminary study are: (1) to overview the merger/consolidation cases and discuss how 
the results of the incentive measures so far (Do RBs utilize those measures?), and (2) to 
examine if there is any divergence or mismatch between the measures and actual merger/ 
consolidation cases. 
This paper consists as follows: in Section 2, the presence and size of physical network of 
the rural banking sector are overviewed; in Section 3, BSP’s programs to promote rural bank 
mergers/consolidations are described; in Section 4, the actual merger/consolidation cases among 
rural banks and their characteristics are examined; and the last section concludes. 
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2. Profile of the Philippine rural banks 
 
The Philippine RB sector’s share in the total resources in the country’s financial system has 
been declined in the past decades, and not exceeded a few percent in the recent years.
1
 On the 
contrary, the number of institutions in the sector overwhelms those of other categories (universal 
and commercial banks, and thrift banks) in the banking sector. However, Figure 1 shows that 
since 2000, more than 260 RBs have (voluntarily or forcefully) exited from the market, and the 
tendency has been strengthened since 2007-2008. 
 
 
Figure 1: Numbers of head offices and closed banks, average number of offices by bank  
categories, 2000-2016 (end of the year) 
 
[Note] UB & KB: universal and commercial banks, TB: thrift banks, RB: rural banks. 
[Source] BSP statistics. 
 
 
Figure 2 provides a closer look, focusing on the RB sector. It clearly shows that the 
years 2007-2008 is a turning point for the sector. After 2008, more than 25 RBs on average are 
closed annually, compared with 9 RBs every year during 2001-2007. As the number of RBs 
                                                   
1
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declines, average numbers of branches have increased and then tripled in the past 15 years, from 
about 1.5 offices per a RB in 2000 to 4.5 offices in 2016. It implies that RBs surviving in the 
market purchased and/or merged physical networks of exiting RBs, or further, that the RB sector 
has become polarized: most of non-viable RBs have been exited from the sector and viable ones 
have been extending their branch networks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Numbers of head offices and closed banks, average number of offices of rural banks, 
2000-2016 (end of the year) 
 
[Note] The numbers in parentheses are those of closed rural banks in each year (net). 
[Source] BSP statistics. 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the numbers of RB head offices, branches per an RB on average, 
and that of unbanked cities and municipalities in each region at end-2008 and end-2016, 
respectively. In spite that the names and geographical regional borders are not completely the 
same between end-2008 and end-2016, what we can clearly observe from the Figures are: (1) 
RBs are more densely located in economically-large and populated areas, such as the National 
Capital Region (NCR) and its surrounding regions, e.g., CALABARZON (Region 4-A in Figure 
4) and Central Luzon, as well as other banking sectors (universal/commercial banks and thrift 
banks); (2) the density of RBs and the scale of branch networks have not been drastically 
changed between the two points; (3) especially from Figure 4, there is a strong inverse 
correlation between the distribution of RBs and the numbers of unbanked cities and 
municipalities by region – the less and smaller RBs and their branch networks are located in one 
region, the more it has unbanked cities and municipalities. Another point notable is that in 
Davao Region (Southern Mindanao in Figure 3), the average branch network has been 
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drastically expanded in the eight years although the number of RBs has been halved in the same 
period. It implies an RB(s) was established as a result of a large-scale merger/consolidation, or 
some RBs conducted many merger/consolidations to expand their business networks. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of rural banks and their physical networks by region (as of December 2008) 
 
[Note] The numbers in squares are average numbers of branches. Those in parentheses are the number of the region. 
      The numbers of unbanked cities and municipalities by region at end-December 2008 are not available. 
[Source] BSP statistics. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of rural banks and their physical networks (as of December 2016), 
 and the numbers of unbanked cities and municipalities by region 
 
[Note] Same as Figure 3. 
[Source] BSP statistics. 
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3. Incentives for mergers/consolidations for rural banks 
 
As already seen in Section 2 (Figure 1), the RB sector has been much smaller than other sectors 
(universal/commercial banks and thrift banks) in the industry in terms of each RB’s scale and 
physical network. However, the BSP has put a vital importance on the sector in view of 
economic/industrial development in the rural areas (i.e., non-National Capital Region and its 
surrounding regions) thus the BSP has solicited the RB sector to further improve and expand 
their financial/business bases for serving more effectively much-needed financial access/ 
facilities and better contributing to ensure balanced and sustainable economic growth in their 
localities. Followings are the incentive programs provided by the BSP and other related 
agencies to the RB sector. As of March 2017, only the CPRB is available. 
For the discussions later, another measure, which indirectly promotes mergers/ 
consolidations, is described at the end of this section. 
 
3.1 Strengthening Program for Rural Banks (SPRB) 
 
Originally established in December 2009, the SPRB is a program jointly conceptualized by the 
BSP and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) aimed at promoting mergers, 
consolidations and acquisitions (MCAs) through the grant of financial assistance (FA) to 
eligible strategic third party investors (STPIs) as a means to further strengthen the rural banking 
system and to help eligible RBs to survive, mainly those that are capital deficient.  
Under the SPRB, a common fund of up to 5.0-billion pesos shared equally between the 
BSP and the PDIC of up to 2.5-billion pesos each, was prepared. The main feature of FAs to the 
STPIs are granting of (1) a combination of (a) subscription to preferred shares to provide 
additional capital to reinforce the capital position of the STPIs by the BSP and PDIC up to 
100% of the preferred shares, and (b) direct loans, or (2) single FA of (a) or (b). Pre-regulatory 
relief by the BSP to the RBs desiring to enter into mergers and consolidations with eligible 
distressed RBs may be considered under the SPRB.
2
 The SPRB was available until 17 
September, 2015. 
 
3.2 Consolidation Program for Rural Banks (CPRB) 
 
Similar to the SPRB, the Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP has approved-in-principle on 18 
June 2015 the Consolidation Program for Rural Banks (CPRB), a progressive incentive program 
jointly conceptualized by the BSP, the PDIC, and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to 
                                                   
2
 BSP (2016) Manual of Regulations for Banks, p. 75. 
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encourage mergers and consolidations among the RBs. With the approvals by the PDIC Board 
and the LBP President, the CPRB Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) contains the terms and 
conditions as well as other arrangements among the foregoing agencies in implementing the 
program. The program was inaugurated on 26 August, 2015, and will be available for two (2) 
years until 25 August 2017. 
 
Table 1: Program supports under the CPRB 
Condition for 
Applicability 
A “consolidation” should involve the combination of at least five (5) RBs, resulting 
in their dissolution and the creation of a new entity, subject to the provisions of 
existing applicable and relevant laws. 
   
Sorts of Services 
Ratios of 
Supports 
Services Applicable to Supports 
Financial 
advisory service 
80% of the cost, 
by CFIEP 
(a) Advisory on the general conduct of the merger/consolidation 
process in relation to the program requirements; 
(b) Engagement of financial and legal advisers on the optimal 
merger/ consolidation structure; 
(c) Due diligence and valuation activities and presentation of the 
results thereof to the Board of Directors and the shareholders 
of the proponent banks; 
(d) Documentation of transaction and submissions to regulatory 
agencies. 
Business process 
improvement 
services 
80% for 1
st
 year, 
50% for 2
nd
 year 
of the cost, 
by CFIEP 
(a) Integration process (data and records integration, 
consolidation of backroom activities, financial reporting); 
(b) Development and updating of manuals; 
(c) Guidance of automation/new system requirement as a result 
of integration 
Capacity building 
support services 
To be funded 
by CFIEP, BSP,  
LBP and PDIC 
(a) Training* – credit evaluation and administration, audit and 
internal control, personnel management, accounting/record 
keeping, treasury, information technology; 
(b) Governance. 
Others  Possible equity participation by LBP. 
BSP to observe full flexibility in the grant of incentives allowable 
under existing banking laws and regulations including BSP 
Circular Nos. 771 dated October 11 2012 and 494 dated 20 
September 2005. 
Other incentives as may be approved by the PDIC, LBP, and 
CFIEP. 
[Note] For example, the Rural Bank Management Course, a four-day training program targeted for the board of 
directors and senior officers of rural banks, which was developed by the BSP Supervision and Examination Sector 
and was handed over to the Rural Bankers’ Association of the Philippines. 
[Source] BSP Circular Letter No. CL-2015-043 and 050. 
 
The features of CPRB sprang from the need to strengthen the RB industry, in recognition 
of the major role that RBs play in financial inclusion. It intends to promote mergers and 
consolidations among RBs to bring about a less fragmented banking system by enabling them to 
improve financial strength, enhance viability, strengthen management and governance and 
expand market reach, among others. What is different from the SPRB is that (1) the supports 
provided under the CPRB can only be applicable to “collective” mergers/consolidations, and (2) 
10 
the Countryside Financial Institutions Enhancement Program (CFIEP), consistent with its 
mandate to improve the countryside financial institutions’ long-term sustainability and viability, 
sets 25 million pesos aside to fund the implementation of the program in support of the CPRB. 
The amount will support the financial advisory, business process improvement, and 
capacity-building support services, necessary to ensure the attainment of the program’s 
objectives (Table 1). On its part, the BSP observes full flexibility in granting regulatory and 
other incentives allowable under existing banking laws and regulations including BSP Circular 
No. 237 as amended by Circular Nos. 771 dated 11 October 2012 and 494 dated 20 September 
2005. 
 
3.3 Strengthening Program for Cooperative Banks (SPCB) and SPCB Plus 
 
In addition to the programs to promote mergers/consolidations among RBs, the SPRB, the BSP, 
PIDS and LBP also provided a similar facility to cooperative banks (CBs), named Strengthening 
Program for Cooperative Banks (SPCB) during 2010-2012. The concept and structure of the 
SPCB was quite the same as the SPRB, aimed to encourage mergers, consolidation and 
acquisitions of cooperative banks to strengthen the cooperative banking sector, via the grant of 
financial assistance from the PDIC and LBP, and regulatory relief(s), branching and other 
incentives from the BSP. 
The replacement of the expired SPCB, the SPCB Plus, was started in 2014, which 
expanded the eligible STPIs, not only CBs, but also (1) well-managed rural banks and thrift 
banks, whether or not majority owned or not by cooperatives, primary cooperatives and/or 
federation of cooperatives, and (2) commercial banks, in view of realizing a new banking 
partnerships.  
Though the availability of SPCB Plus was closed on 17 September, 2015 (BSP Circular 
Letter No. CL-2015-029), one consolidation case was completed under the SPCB Plus. Six (6) 
cooperative banks
3
 and National Confederation of Cooperatives as an STPI were reorganized 
under the name of Network Consolidated Cooperative Bank, and started operation in September 
2014. 
 
3.4 Another measure for promoting mergers/consolidations 
 
Other than directly providing financial assistances to the financial institutions which considers 
mergers/consolidations, to revise the minimum capital levels upward may have an effective and 
                                                   
3
 Those cooperative banks were: Cooperative Bank of Agusan del Sur, Capiz Settlers Cooperative Rural 
Bank, Inc., Cooperative Bank of Camarines Norte, Cooperative Bank of Leyte, Sorsogon Provincial 
Cooperative Bank, and Southern Leyte Cooperative Bank. 
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strong influence on the decisions of the banking sector. 
On 20 October 2014, BSP decided to further strengthen the banking system with the 
upward revision in minimum capital levels. It is a separate requirement from compliance with 
risk-based capital adequacy ratios in accordance with Basel III requirements as implemented by 
BSP Circular Nos. 781 and 822 dated 15 January 2013 and 13 December 2013, respectively. 
The minimum capital requirement for universal and commercial banks has not changed since 
1999 while that of thrift and rural banks’ were last increased in 2010 and 2011. As we see later 
in the next section, the number of BSP-approved merger/consolidations among RBs in 2011 
recorded the highest, realized in one year. 
The 2014 revision has new characteristics: the thrift, rural and cooperative banks, both the 
location of the head office and size of the physical network (number of branches) are considered 
in tiering the minimum capital requirements, unlike the replaced regulation by category, which 
had only the criteria on the location of their head office.
4
 Existing banks (including those which 
are newly authorized but not yet operating) that cannot immediately meet the new minimum 
capital requirement may avail of a five-year transition period to fully comply. Such banks are 
required to submit an acceptable capital build-up program to the BSP. Banks that fail to propose 
an acceptable capital build-up or otherwise fail to comply with the minimum capital 
requirements face curtailment of future expansion plans. 
According to the BSP, asset growth, increasing complexity, technological innovations, 
liberalization of more foreign bank entries in the universal and commercial banking sector, the 
opening of rural banks to foreign investments, and the ASEAN regional banking integration 
were considered in adjusting the minimum capitalization of banks. Further, Consistent with 
global efforts to enhance bank regulation, the BSP finds it prudent to continuously update 
domestic regulatory standards given the ever-changing risks faced by the banking sector, then, 
well-capitalized domestic banks promote financial stability and effective delivery of financial 
services. 
 
 
4. Overview of the merger/consolidation cases in the RB sector and their characteristics 
 
As already seen in Section 3, the BSP, in cooperation with the PDIC and LBP, has provided the 
incentives and assistances to the RB sector encouraging merger and consolidations among 
themselves and other (non-bank) financial institutions. According to the BSP Circular Letters 
from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2016, there reported eighty-one (81) merger/consolidation 
cases of banks and non-bank financial institutions under BSP’s supervisory authority. Of which, 
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 For details of the new minimum capital requirements, see Annex 1. 
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forty-seven (47) cases involve the RBs as surviving or merged/consolidated counterparts.
5
 In 
the following section, we overview the patters and indicated preferences for mergers/ 
consolidations of the RBs.  
 
4.1 How and when do the RBs merge/consolidate? 
 
Based on the information released in the BSP Circular Letters Series 1996-2016, firstly, all 
mergers/consolidations are divided into three (3) groups, namely, (1) the mergers/consolidations 
solely between/among RBs, (2) those where RBs were merged/consolidated to other financial 
institutions, and (3) those between/among non-RBs (i.e., other banking institutions and 
non-bank financial institutions under the BSP supervision). The group (1) cases are further 
categorized depending on the numbers of RBs involved in each case. Figure 3 shows the shares 
of each group during the whole period 1996-2016, and Figure 4 shows the break-downs by 
group in each year. 
From Figure 3, it is obvious that the RBs have strongly preferred “bilateral” mergers/ 
consolidations, which account 85% of the total forty (40) cases solely between/among RBs. As 
already seen in Section 3.3, the only “Among 5 or more RBs” case was realized by six (6) 
cooperative banks and an STPI and created a new RB in 2014 under the SPCB Plus. 
 
 
Figure 3: BSP-approved mergers/consolidations of the financial institutions by group, 1996-2016 
 
[Note] Inclusive of multi-time cases conducted by one (surviving) financial institutions. 
[Source] BSP Circular Letter Series (various years). 
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 From 1996 to 2001, there was no merger/consolidation case among or related to the rural banks 
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Figure 4: BSP-approved merger/consolidations of the financial institutions, 2000-2016 
 
[Note] No merger/consolidation case related to RBs was approved by the BSP from 1996 to 2001. 
[Source] BSP Circular Letter Series (various years). 
 
 
Although ambiguously but we can see a sort of tendency on the timing where RBs decide 
to merge or consolidate from Figure 4. The findings are: (1) the number of “bilateral” mergers/ 
consolidations increases in the same year or the next when the BSP conducts an upward revision 
in the minimum capitalization requirements, depending on the timing of releasing new 
regulations by the BSP; (2) since 2010, the cases where RBs are merged to other banking 
institutions (universal/commercial banks or thrift banks) are constantly approved; (3) 
considering with the numbers of exited RBs (in Figure 2), those which are not in a good 
financial shape have exited from the market, voluntarily or by BSP’s order of revoking license 
or cease and desist, before finding a “white knight.” Based on these findings, it can be assumed 
regarding the circumstances surrounding the RB industry that the RB mergers/consolidations 
and survival are in general the results influenced by the uncontrollable factors, such as BSP’s 
regulations and/or international accords, and business strategies for the non-NCR regions of the 
players in larger categories (universal/commercial banks and thrift banks), rather than by RBs’ 
own business strategies.  
 
4.2 Do RBs grow in terms of size (physical network) and financial basis? 
 
On the other hand, there are some RBs which have clearly shown expansive strategies during 
the analyzed period. Although the number of samples is small (three in total), of which, two 
RBs have conducted multiple – basically bilateral – mergers and upgraded themselves to be 
authorized as thrift banks. Another RB stays in the same category, but has grown up to one of 
0
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the largest in the industry in terms of their physical networks and capitalization. Figures 5-7 
illustrate how they have developed through mergers. 
 
 
Figure 5: “Multiple” merger/consolidations by a rural bank 
Pattern A-1: Upgrading from an RB to a thrift bank (TB) 
(Head Office located in Pasig City, NCR, with 141 offices including Head Office) 
<Thrift 
Bank> 
     (2012) Producers 
Savings 
Bank Corp. 
 (2013)  (2015)  (2015) 
              
<Rural 
Bank> 
Producers 
RB Corp. 
(2002)  (2002)          
              
 
 RB  RB  RB   TB  RB  RB 
[Note] Banks in bold squares are surviving (merging) or newly established/renamed banks. Others are merged ones. 
RB: a rural bank, TB: a thrift bank, Dev’t Bank: a development bank, which is included in the category of  
thrift banks. 
Numbers in parentheses are the years where the merger/consolidation cases were completed. 
[Source] BSP Circular Letter Series (various issues). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: “Multiple” merger/consolidations by a rural bank 
Pattern A-2: Upgrading from an RB to a TB 
(Head Office located in Cagayan de Oro City, non-NCR region, with 45 offices 
including Head Office) 
<Thrift 
Bank> 
    (2013) 1st Valley 
Bank, Inc. 
(Dev’t Bank) 
 
        
<Rural 
Bank> 
RB 
 (2005)     
   1st Valley 
Bank, Inc. 
(RB) 
    
 
 
RB    RB   
[Note] Same as Figure 5. 
[Source] Same as Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: “Multiple” merger/consolidations by a rural bank 
Pattern B: Without upgrading 
        (Head Office located in Davao City, non-NCR region, with 130 offices including Head Office) 
       (2004)     
<Rural 
Bank> 
Network 
Rural Bank 
Inc. 
(2002)  (2002)   One 
Network 
RB Inc. 
 (2011)  (2013) 
             
 
 RB  RB  RB  RB  RB  RB 
[Source] Same as Figure 5. 
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Two cases in Figures 5 (Pattern A-1) and 6 (Pattern A-2) are both of RBs which upgraded 
themselves to thrift banks (TBs) through mergers more than twice. Differences between A-1 
and A-2 are: (1) if the RB is the only surviving bank throughout the period (in the A-2 case, 
two RBs were consolidated in 2005 and became a newly established RB); and (2) if the 
surviving bank conducted other mergers after upgrading. As of end-2016, both TBs have larger 
branch networks than the average of the whole TB industry, especially, that of the TB in Figure 
5 is close to the average of the universal and commercial bank sector. 
Contrarily, Figure 7 (Pattern B) shows that an RB conducted five mergers (six RBs in 
total) in the past 15 years, likewise the TB in Figure 5, and developed its branch network 
close to the average of the universal/commercial banks. Although the RB did not choose to be 
authorized as of end-2016, it is assumed that the RB is one of the largest/dominant banks in 
the Region in terms of the branch network. 
The above three cases imply that some RBs have an intention to strengthen their financial 
and physical basis and continue to grow, but as already described in the previous section, 
most of the merger/consolidation cases are bilateral and “one-shot” (not multiple or 
conducted by one RB more than twice) thus it suggests that the cases so far are not results of 
each RB’s active/expansive business strategy, but of passive choice influenced by the 
regulatory and supervisory circumstances. The time may have yet to come for the RB 
industry to aspire further development transcending the financial/physical situation on a 
moment-to-moment basis under a certain set of regulation and supervision. 
 
4.3 Mismatch between the incentive measures and the reality? 
 
Three cases described above are considered out of BSP’s incentive measures, especially the 
well-funded CPRB and SPCB Plus
6
, under which large-scale mergers (at least among five 
banks) are encouraged for the availment of financial assistances. The regulatory side indicated 
the situation as follows: 
 
“… our (BSP’s) efforts to promote mergers and consolidations have yet to produce the 
results we look forward to. While we continue to receive applications for incentives under 
the BSP-PDIC Strengthening Program for Rural Banks, the reality is… less than 20% of 
available funding for capital build-up has been utilized.” (Tetangco, Jr. (2013))  
 
Then, why RBs have not actively utilized them? Although the number of actual cases is 
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 The RBs, before upgrading themselves to TBs, may have availed capital assistances from the incentive 
measures in each merger case. As the BSP has not published any analyses or data regarding those 
measures yet, further information and clarifications are needed for . 
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limited, two aspects can be pointed out based on the “multiple” merger/consolidations. First, 
there seems certain mismatch between the program periods of the incentive measures and the 
planning and time frame of the RBs that intend to merge other banks or expand their business 
scale. In the cases described in the previous section, those RBs have spent a decade before 
achieving to their current business scale through multiple mergers. Therefore, the time frame 
and scope of BSP’s incentive measures – usually available/applicable for only one or two years, 
though the expiring dates have been sometimes extended – have some difficulty to align those 
on the RBs’ side. 
On the other hand, if the BSP and related parties put a high importance on promoting 
“large-scale” mergers/consolidations, it would be necessary for them to think about providing 
some separate/additional supports (financially, technically and/or on the information basis) 
applicable for RBs on the stage of finding/identifying possible consolidation counterparts. Even 
an intention to merge/consolidate is put aside, the business and financial scale of RBs are quite 
smaller compared with those of TBs and universal/commercial banks. Naturally it is presumed 
that each RB by itself does not have enough/abundant financial affordability for going through 
the process. In addition to such research costs, finding a merger/consolidation counterpart is 
quite opportunity-depending. Thus, it would be highly contributive to the RBs which have 
willingness to merge/consolidate if those intentions are gathered and available as information on 
the regional/prefectural base, given the business scale of RBs. Regional rural bank associations 
and/or BSP regional branches are possibly able to play a certain role as information providers. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As having seen above, most mergers and consolidations of RBs are “bilateral” and “one-time,” 
which seemingly completed as a result of uncontrollable changes of their business environment 
such as regulatory revisions and/or market competitions. As discussed in Aragon, et.al. (2011) 
and BSP Governor’s speeches (Tetangco, Jr. (2013, 2014)) if every RB plays an important role 
as a catalyst for rural economic development, and a reduction of its presence in those rural areas 
may have adverse consequences for rural development, it is necessary to expand the scope of 
the incentive measures more suitable/applicable to the actual merger/consolidation processes 
which RBs have taken. For further encouraging the whole RB industry to reconsider and 
rationalize their business bases/scales, a sort of bird’s eye view and information on the RB 
industry – provided by regional rural bank associations and/or BSP regional branches at least by 
the prefectures or the regions – would help the RBs to identify possible merger/consolidation 
counterparts. 
17 
On deepening the discussion of this issue, further information is to be collected, for 
example, (1) more details about the merger/consolidation cases, e.g., financial conditions of the 
merged RBs at that time, capital scale and structure increase of the surviving banks, etc., (2) 
regional disparities/distribution of the merger/consolidation cases, (3) the actual financial 
assistances availed by the RBs under the SPRB, CPRB/CPRB Plus, and SPCB/SPCB Plus. 
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Annex 1: Amended (increased) minimum capital level requirement for all banks 
(BSP Monetary Board decision on October 20, 2014) 
Bank Category/Network Size 
Old Minimum 
Capitalization 
Revised Minimum 
Capitalization 
●Universal Banks P4.95 billion**  
Head Office Only  P3.00 billion 
Up to 10 branches*  6.00 billion 
11 to 100 branches*  15.00 billion 
More than 100 branches*  20.00 billion 
●Commercial Banks P2.40 billion**  
Head Office only  P2.00 billion 
Up to 10 branches*  4.00 billion 
11 to 100 branches*  10.00 billion 
More than 100 branches*  15.00 billion 
●Thrift Banks   
Head Office in:   
   Metro Manila P1.00 billion**  
   Cebu and Davao cities 500 million**  
   Other Areas 250 million**  
Head Office in the National Capital Region (NCR) 
Head Office only  P500 million 
Up to 10 branches*  750 million 
11 to 50 branches*  1.00 billion 
More than 50 branches*  2.00 billion 
Head Office in All Other Areas Outside NCR 
Head Office only  P200 million 
Up to 10 branches*  300 million 
11 to 50 branches*  400 million 
More than 50 branches*  800 million 
●Rural and Cooperative Banks   
Head Office in:   
   Metro Manila P100 million**  
   Cebu and Davao Cities 50 million**  
   Other cities 25 million**  
   1
st
 to 4
th
 class municipalities 10 million**  
   5
th
 to 6
th
 class municipalities 5 million**  
Head Office in the NCR:   
Head Office only  P50 million 
Up to 10 branches*  75 million 
11 to 50 branches*  100 million 
More than 50 branches*  200 million 
Head Office in All Other Areas Outside NCR (All cities up to 3
rd
 class municipalities) 
Head Office only  P20 million 
Up to 10 branches*  30 million 
11 to 50 branches*  40 million 
More than 50 branches*  80 million 
Head Office in All Other Areas Outside NCR (4
th
 to 6
th
 class municipalities) 
Head Office only  P10 million 
Up to 10 branches*  15 million 
11 to 50 branches*  20 million 
More than 50 branches*  40 million 
[Note] *: Inclusive of Head Office. **: With no distinction for network size. 
[Source] BSP Media Releases, dated on October 20, 2014. 
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